Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector by Martin Feldstein & Lawrence H. Summers
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INFLATION AND THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME
IN THE CORPORATE SECTOR
MARTIN FELDSTEIN
LAWRENCE SUMMERS
Working Paper No. 312
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge MA 02138
January 1979NBER Working Paper 312
January 1979
SUMMARY




This paper presents a detailed examination of the effect of
inflation on the taxation of capital used in the nonfinancial
sector of the U.S. economy. In contrast to previous studies of
the relation between inflation and corporate tax burdens, we
consider not only the tax paid by the corporations themselves but
also the tax paid by the individuals and institutions that provide
capital to the corporate sector.
According to our calculations, the effect of inflation with the
existing tax laws was to raise the 1977 tax burden on corporate
sector capital income by more than $32 billion, an amount equal to
69 percent of the real after tax capital income of the nonfinancial
corporate sector (including dividends, retained earnings and real
interest). This extra tax raised the total effective tax rate from
43 percent to 66 percent of capital income in the nonfinancial
corporate sector.
A separate analysis for each of 20 manufacturing industries
shows substantial variation among these industries in the relative
importance of this increased taxation. Inflation therefore can
distort the allocation of capital among industries as well as the
total volume of corporate capital formation.
The paper considers the role of corporate debt in detail.
Inflation distorts taxation by allowing corporations to deduct no-
minal interest payments that exceed real interest but then taxes
lenders on their nominal receipts. Our analysis shows that the
additional taxes paid by lenders exceed the tax saving by corporate
borrowers. Since the difference between the relevant tax rates
of borrowers and lenders is quite small, the mismeasurement of
interest income and expenses can be ignored without seriously
distorting the evaluation of the overall effect of inflation on
the taxation of corporate sector capital.
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This paper presents a detailed eXamination of the effect of inflation
on the taxation of capital used in the nonfillancial corporate sector of
the u.S. economy. Our analysis shows that, with current tax laws,inflation
substantially mcreases the effective tax rate on capital incorre m the
corporate .sector. The principal reason for this is that the historic cost
n:ethod of depreciation causes a major overstaterrent of taxable profits, Le.,
historic cost.depreciaton results in a large mcrease m the level of real
taxable profits at any level of.real economic profits. current rrethods
of inventory accounting add further to this overstatement of profits for tax
purposes•.
According to our nost comprehensive calculation, the effect of inflation
with existing tax laws was to raise the 1977 tax burden on corporate sector
capital income by m:>re than $32 billion. 'Ihis extra tax burden was equivalent
to 69 percent of the real after-tax capital incane of the nonfinancial corporate
sector, including retained earnmgs, elividends, and real interest receipts
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of the oorporations' creditors. Since our calculations show that the total
tax burden on this oorporate capital incorre was $92 billion, the extra tax
burden raised the tax by rrore than 54 p ..~rcent. The total effective tax rate
on oorporate sector capital incarre in 1977 was 66 percent; without the
extra tax caused by inflation, the effective tax rate would have been only
4J -percent.
In contrast to previous studies of the relation between inflation
and oorporate tax burdens, we oonsider not only the tax paid by the
oorporations themselves but also the tax paid by the individuals and mstitutions
that·supply €apital to the corporate sector.1 This is particularly important
for a oorrect treatrrent of oorporate debt. Inflation implies that the
nominal interest payrrents that oorporatLons deduct in calculating
taxable profits exceed the real oost of borrowed funds; in itself, this
. . 2
tends to understate real profits and to lower the effec.t1.ve tax rate.
However, the individuals and institutions that lend to. the oorporations
are taxed on the overstated nominal interest income.3
Our calculations
show that the excess tax :p.a.id by the lenders is slightly greater than the
tax saving of thecorpOrate borrowers. Since the difference between the
relevant tax rate for borrowers and lenders is quite small, the miSITEasure-
ment of interest incorre (or, equivalently, the real gains and losses on net
oorporate debt) can be ignored without seriously distorting the evaluation
of the overall effect 6f inflation on the taxation of corporate sector
capital. i ...
l.Studies t..;at ha"\~-focused on inflation's effect on corporate taxes includ.e
Davidson and ~veil (1977), Lovell (1978), Shoven and Bulow (1976) and Tideman and
Tucker (1977). The iIrportance of looking through the corporation to examine
.tberetU1.il to·suppliers of debt and equity capital is stressed in Feldstein
(1976), Feldstein, Green .and Sheshinski (1978), and Feldstein and Stm1'rers
(1978) . ~
2Allowing the deduction of.nominal interest payrrents that exceed real interest
payr.ents is equivalent to ignoring the real gains ~t accrue to corporations
as inflation reduces the real value of outstanding corporate debt. In this <Xl(l-
text, debt should of course be reganled as gross debt· mitiA;:}tr nomirial assets.
3'lhe extent of this taxation differs substantially am::mg the different classes of
lenders.-3-
In addition to our analysis of the nonfinancial corporate sector as
a whole, the present study makes use of an important new source of data
for individual firms on the values of both replacerrent cost depreciation
and depreciation based on historic costs. Beginning with the year 1976,
the 8ecurities and Exchange COmmission has required large corporations to
provide information on replacement cost depreciation and inventory profits
as Part of their annual form lO-K reports. We use these data together with
other information on the financial and real performance of 327 individual
manufacturing firms in order to examine how inflation has raised the
effective tax rates on different industries.
In the first section of this study, we ignore the miSIreasuremant
of ib~stexpenses and incc:m: in order to focus on the additional taxation
caused by historic cost depreciation and by existing. inventory accounting
rrethods. section 2 then shows that the corporate tax savings that result
from overstating real interest expenses are slightly rrore than balanced by
the greater tax burdens that the miSIreasurerrent of interest incc:m: irrposes
on the individuals and institutions that directly and indirectly supply debt
capital to the corporate sector. The total increase in tax liabilities on
corporate source ineate due to inflation is then estimated in section 3.
Section 4 describes inflation's impact on effective tax rates. The fifth
section then uses the data on individual firms to calculate the extent of
additional taxation in each of the 20 different manufacturing industries.
There is a brief concluding section that discusses the implications of these
1 higher effective tax rates for capital formation and economic performance.
lThe analysis relates only to nonfinancial corporations even when the text
refers only to corporations. Throughout the study we make no attertlf>t to assess
the extent to which the initial tax burdens are shifted to other capital or
to labor by changes in the allocation of capital or in the financial decisions
of households and firms. We also ignore state and local taxes and to that extent,
understate total tax burdens.-4-
1. ~preciation Rules, Inventory Accounting and Corporate Tax Payments
A desirable taxation criterion is that :rreal tax payments should not
be affected by changes in the overall price level which do not alter real
inccme or wealth. Our tax system violates this standard in its treat:m:mt
of corporate profits. ~.vhen the price level rises and firms' real profits
remain constant, their real tax payments rise both because of historical cost
depreciation and FIFO inventory accounting. The real cost of the depreciating
of a finn's capital stock is the replacerrent cost of the obsolescent capital.
Yet for tax purPOses finns are only pennitted to deduct depreciation based
on the original purchase price. In inflationary periods, this may be much
less than the replacerrent cost. Similarly, the cost of depleting inventories,
is the replacerrent cost of the goods, not their original acquisition cost.
Firms which use FIFO inventory cost deduct only the acquisition cost, giving
rise to phantan inventory:,.:iprofits.
In this section, we discuss our estimates of how much existing
depreciation and inventory rules raise corporate taxes in our inflationary
economy. We ignore the role of debt and limit our attention to the tax
burdens at the level of the corporation; this restriction is droPPed in the
subsequent sections where, as we noted in the introduction, we show that
explicit recognition of debt has little effect on the total additional
taxation of all the capital used in the corporate sector because of the
offsetting effects of inflation on the taxation of borrowers and lenders.
We begin this section by exaI!lining the experience for 1977, the rrost recent
year for which all the required infonnation is available. We then discuss
the trends in inflation's effects on the ta,'ffition of corporate source
incorre over the period since 1954.-5-
1.1 The Experience of 1977
Before looking in dete1.il at the data for 1977, we can surmnarize
briefly the impact of inflation on the taxes paid by nonfinancial corporations
in 1977. The cumulative effect of inflation reduced the depreciation allowed
on existing plant and equiprent by $39.7 billion in 1977. This raised
corporate tax payrre:n.ts by $19 billion, on nearly one-third of the $59 billion
of corporate tax liabilities for 1977. Artifical inventory profits added
an additional $7 billion to tax liabilities. Thus, inflation raised corporate
taxes from $33 billion to $59 billion, an increase of 79 percent. Stnting
this in a different way, the additional corporate tax caused by inflation
accounts for 57 percent of the $59 billion of corporate tax liabilities in
1977.
we can now examine the specific data used to calculate these
additional tax burdens. The official national ineate account estimate of
the 1977 real profits of nonfinancial corporations was $113.9 billion.l
Taxable profits for those corporations were $143.5 billion in the same
year. '!he $30 billion difference between these two profit figures is the
Stml of the inventory valuation adjustJrent and the capital consumption
adjust:Irent. The inventory valuation adjust:Irent (IVA) of $14.8 billion
implies that inflation added $14.8 billion of false inventory profits
to taxable ineate. The capital consumption adjust:Irent (CCA) of $14.7
billion actually ref~ects two countervailing differences between real
straight-line depreciation and the depreciation allowed for tax P'llI"POses:
lsurvey of Current Business, November 1978.For earlier years, we use the
Survey of Current Business, March 1976, pages 53-57, and updates in the
Survey 'of-Current -BUSiness: .Dep'recia1;.i~is based on straight-line depre-
ciation at 85 percent of the Bulletin F lives with depreciation calculated
at replacenent cost. - . .,.' --6-
the accelerated depreciation rules made tax-deductible depreciation exceed
straight-line depreciation by $25.0 billion while inflation reduced the
value of tax-deduCtible depreciation and raised taxable profits by
$39.7 billion. We shall refer to the u..'O components of the CCA as the
"accelerntion ccmponent" (CCA-A) and the "i."1flation CC'l!l'POIlent" (CCA-I). Thus
historic cost depreciation plus .false inventory profits together added
$54.5 billion to taxable profits. With a 48 percent statutory marginal
tax rate, inflation caused a $26 billion increase incorPOrate tax payrrents.
In·calculating the excess corPOrate tax paynents we have :irrplicitly
assumed that accelerated depreciation and the investn:ent tax credit were
8Ilacted to stimulate invesi::Irent and not as .::m offset to inflation. It is
clear that these features \vere enacted long before adjusting taxable income
for inflation was a serious issue. Accelerated depreciation was int.."'"CX1uced
to the tax law in 1954 (a year in which the CPI actually fell) because of a
conviction that tax depreciation lives were too long. Extensions of accelerated
depreciation .in subsequent years appear to have been instituted by a desire
to stimulate invest:.m:mt rat."1er than as an offset to inflation. As Stanley
Surrey noted in connection with the 1971 acct:leration provisions that created
the asset depreciation range (ADR) system, "The new ADR system was urged by
the Treasury and adopted by the COngress in 1971 not as a device needed to
measure real net inoone •.. but as incentive for e.e purchases of new machinery
and equiprent." (Surrey, 1973, p. 32 ). Similarly the investrrent ~: credit
was introduced as a countercyclic::.l :rrcasure to simulate demand in 1962, a year
in "f,ymch b.~ CPI rose only 1.2 percent.
Although the tax credits and accelerated depreciation that was
legislated before the recent inflation can clearly be regarded as invest:Iret1t
i11ce..'1tives rat.~r than offsets to inflation, it can be argued that the changes-7-
made in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (and .in subsequent legislation) "W'erC
intended at least partly as an offset to the inflationary distortions of the
tax liabilities.1 It is wortbernphasizing therefore that these tax charges
have done relatively little to reduce corporate taxes. The accelerated
depreciation ccmponent of the capital consumption adjustJ:rent rose from
$20~4 billion in 1975 to $25.0 billion in 1977, an increase proportional
to the naninal level of fixed invest::Irent on the nonfinancial corporate
sector. The increase iLi the arrount of the investment tax credit between
1975 and 1977 due to the liberalization enacted in 19751 cannot be measured
precisely but a reasonably accurate IIupper-boundII estimate can be made.
If the three percent increase in the I.T.C. rate'applied to all equiprrent
invest:nent in 1977, the additional tax credit for nonf.inancial corporations
would have been only $3.4 billion. This is clearly an overestimate of the
additional .invest::Irent tax credit because various limitations prevent all
corporations from using the full 10 percent credit a"'1.q occause the rate is
less than 10 percent on certai.i1 types of equip:nent. Furthe:rrrore, the 1975
liberalization of the loT.C. can be ascribed at least as plausibly to anti-
recession policy as to a desire to offset inflation's LipClct o~ taxable
profits.
1.2 The Period S.ince 1954
It is useful now to see the grow.ing impact of .inflation on tax
liabilities by examin.ing the evolution of taxable incanz and taxes s.ince 1954.2
This analysis SI-IOWS thc::.t, although .inflation has caused serre increa;;e in
corporate taxes for the past two decades, the period since 1970 has seen
lThe Tax RGd.uction Act of 1975 rai~ed the invest.rrent tax credit from 7 percent
to 10 perce."1t and liberalized the accelerated depreciation rules.
2. . , , ..
We begin with 1954 to avoid ·thecomplexit.ie6 of 'the excess profits taxes'1:hcrt
were levied-during the Korean War. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 represented
a major overhaul of the tax law that, with arrendrrents, continues to provide
the framework for current tax legi.slation.-8-
dramatically greater tax increases induced by inflation.
Table 1 presents annual infonnatioi"l on 'l;he distortion of taxable
profits caused by historic cost depreciation (CCA-I) and by artificial inventory
accounting prcfits (IVA), the additional tax due to each of these, and tl1e
proportion of actual taxes that are accountE:d for by these excess taxes.
Consider fi:r:s.tthe reduced depreciation for tax purposes cau:::ed by
historic cost accounting. Column 2 shows that this reduction in depreciation
(CCA-I) remained less than $10 billion a year until 1970 but reached $39.7
billion in 1977. The 1977 level is nearly double the 1974 level and nearly
eight tiIres the level of 1967. This is reflected in the corresponding
excess taxes shown in column 5. While the excess tax due to historic cost
depreciation varied between $2 billion and $3 billion a year until 1967, it
has doubled every three years since then: the excess taxes rose fran $2.4
billior. in 1967 to $4.8 billion in 1970, $10.3 billion in 1974, and.$19.l
billion iI). 1977. While the excess tax caused by histbDic cost depreciation
accounted fer 9 percent of actual. corporate taxes i.."1 1967 {see column 8),.
they accounted for 32 percent of the taxes paid in 1977.
The artificial inventory profits also remained very small U1"1.til
1967, never reaching $3 billion (column 3). More recently, however, inventory
profits have e~""edcd $10 billion a year and the resulting excess profits
r...ave accounted for rrore than ten percent of a~tual taxes paid.
Column 10 sumnarizes the overall effect of both sources of increased
taxation. Until 1967, the excess tax caused by inflation accounted for 10 percent
to 20 percent of the corporate taxes actual1y paid. This implies t..'1atTABLE 1
Inflation and Corporate Tax Liabilities, 1954-77
Year Inflation Overstatement of Taxable Protits Excess Tax Due to Percent of Actual Taxes
Rate Due To
Reduced Inflated Total Reduced Inflated Total Reduced Inflated Total
Depreciation Inventory Depreciation Inventory Depreei- Inventory
(CPI) Profits Profits ation Profits
(CCA-I) (IVA)
--Billions of Dollars- Billions of Dollars Percent--
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1954 -0.5 4.3 J 0.3 4.6 2.2 0.2 2.4 14.3 1.0 15.3
1955 0.4 4.4 1.7 6.1 2.3 0.9 3.2 11.3 4.4 15.7
1956 2.9 5.4 2.7 8.1 2.8 1.4 4.2 14.0 7.0 21.0
1957 3.0 6.0 1.5 7.5 3.1 0.8 3.9 16.4 4.2 20.6 J>
1958 1.8 6.0 0.3 6.3 3.1 0.1 3.3 19.4 0.8 20.2 I
1959 1.5 5.9 0.5 6.4 3.1 0.2 3.3 14.8 1.2 16.0
1960 1.5 6.2 -0.3 5.9 3.2 -0.2 3.1 16.8 -0.9 15.9
1961 0.7 5.0 -0.1 4.9 2.6 -0.1 2.5 13.4 -0.3 13.1
1962 1.2 4.6 -0.1 4.5 2.4 -0.1 2.3 11.6 -0.4 11.2
1963 1.6 4.1 0.2 3.9 2.1 0.1 2.2 9.4 0.3 9.7
1964 1.2 3.9 0.5 3.4 2.0 0.3 2.2 8.1 1.2 9.3
1965 1.9 3.8 1.9 5.7 1.8 0.9 2.7 6.7 3.3 10.0
1966 3.4 4.2 2.1 6~3 2.0 1.0 3.0 6.8 3.5 10.3
1967 3.0 5.1 1.7 6.8 2.4 0~8 .. 3.3 8.9 3.0 11·9
1968 4.7 6.1 3.4 9.5 3~2 1.8 5.0 9.6 5.4 15.0
1969 6.1 7.7 5.5 13.2 4.1 2.9 7.0 12.2 8.8 21.0
1970 5.5 9.7 5.1 14.8 4.8 2.5 7.3 17.5 9.1 26.6
1971 3.4 11.5 5.0 16.5 5.5 2.4 7.9 18.5 8.1 26.6
1972 3.4 12.5 6.6 19.1 6.0 3.2 9.2 17.9 9.5 27.4
1973 8.8 14.3 18.6 32.9 6.9 8.9 15.8 17.3 22.5 39.8
1974 12.2 21.4 40.4 61.8 10.3 19.4 29.7 24.1 ·45.4 69.5
1975 7.0 32.3 12.1 44.4 15.4 5.8 21.3 38.0 14.2 52.2
1976 4.6 36.0 14.1 50.1 17.3 6.8 24.1 32.2 12.6 44.8
1977 6.8 39.7 14.6 54.3 19.1 7.0 26.1 32.4 12.3 45.7-10-
the excess tax raised the tax that \\Quld otherwise have been paid by up to
25 Percent. During the nest recent five years, however, the excess tax
accoilllted for an average of 50 percent of the corporate taxes actually paid,
implying that these taxes were doubled by the excess tax caused by historic
cost depreciation and inflated invento:ry profits.
It is :i.rrportant to recognize that these distortions will continue
to grow even if the rate of inflation does nbt accelerate any further.
'!he under3tatercent of an asset's depreciation allowanc'e depends on the
increase in the price level since it was purchased. Hence the understatement
of accumulation will rise.until inflation has lasted as long as the oldest
asset which is still being depreciated. '!he accounting conventions used·
in our tax system make taxes very sensitive to the rates of inflation that
....'e have recently experienced. '!he substantial additional tax burden caused
by inflation will continue to grow unless either the tax law or L:he rate of
inflation cha.."1ges significantly.
.':",-11-
2. Inflation and Debt: Corp:>rate Gains and lenders' losses
We nCM tum to the crucial issue of corporate debt. Although
inflation'reduces the real value of outstanding corporate debt, this gain
by cor};X)rations is not taxable income. Equivalently, corporations subtract
nominal instead of real interest payrrents in calculating taxable profits.
A number of previous writers on the relation between inflation and cor};X)rate
taxes have concluded that the corporate tax saving from the exclusion of
real gains on the debt is sufficient to offset the excess tax caused by the mis-
measurement of depreciation and invento:ry profits.l This has been interpreted
.as implying that inflation has no net effect on the taxation of corporate
source inaJJ:te.
These conclusions are misleading because they are based on consider-
ing only sorre of the taxes levied on corporate source income. The basic issue
is not the effect of inflation on the corporations' .tax liability but the·
effect of inflation on the taxation of capital used in the Corporate sector.
It is important to look through the corporation to the individuals and
institutions that provide the equity and debt.capital. The total '1:.J.x on
corporate source incare includes taxes paid by the. owners of corporate
securities on dividends, interest payrrents, and capital gains. It is this
total tax rather than the tax levied at the corporate level alone that
affects econanic incentives.
'Ibis perspective is particularly important with respect to interest
payrrents. ~.vhi.le cor};X)rations are pennitted to deduct nominal rather than
, ,
~or example, Shoven and BulCM (1976) and Cagan and Lipsey (1978) reached
this conclusion.-12-
real interest paymmts, lenders are obliged to pay taxes on nominal
interest receipts. The effect of inflation on the total taxation of interest
incare depends on the relative rnagnitude of the tax rates facing corporate
borrowers on one hand and those who lend to corporations on the other.
If the tax.rate of corporate borrowers exceeds that of lenders, total tax
paymmts fall. otherwise, tax revenues rise.1
The effect of dividend and capital gains ~s Irn.lSt also be considered.
The measurement.of income which gives rise to extra corporate tax payments
reduces dividends and retained ear:Jlings. This causes a reduction in non-
corporate taxes which partly offsets the increase in corporate taxes.
Inflation also increases nominal capital gains but not real capital gains,
leading to increases in noncorporate tax payments. A full calculation
of the effects of inflation on the taxation of corporate source income
requires taking account of these effects. The analysis that we present
in this .section shows that the relevant weighted average of the marginal
tax rates Paid by the individuals and·institutions that lend to nonfinancial
corporations is even greater than the marginal rate of tax that is saved
by corporations and their shareholders because of the overstaterrent of true
interest payments. fibre SPecifically, we shall show that the relevant marginal
tax rate for those who lend to corporations is .0.420 while the relevant
combined rate of corporations and their shareholders as borrowers is
2
0.404. Ignoring the real gains and losses on corporate debt therefore
results in an underestimate of the total excess tax on corporate source incone
IThe potential balancing between borrowers and lenders is stressed in
theoretical nodels of the effect of inflation in Feldstein (1976) and
Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski (1978) .
2The reason why the combined effective marginal tax rates for corporations
and their shareholders is less than the 48 percent corporate rate is that
the extra corporate tax payments lead to a reduction in taxes on dividends
and retained earnings.-13-
that is caused by inflation. However, since the difference between
the effective marginal rates of the borrowers and the .lenders is quite
small ~ the whole issue of the real gains and losses on debt (or the mis-
rreasurerrent of interest payments) can be ignored without distorting the
1
-measurement of the excess tax caused by inflation.
Although we believe it is important to examine the effect of
inflation on the total tax burden on corporate source income, we shall
also analyze the effect of inflation on the tax burden of the corporations
and their shareholders. Our calculations, presented in Section 3, show
that the extra taxes that the corporations and their shareholders pay
because of inflation substantially exceed the arrount they save by ignoring
their inflationary gains on their net debts. Thus whether one looks at
total capital incorne or only at the equity investors, the data show that
inflation raises the effective tax burden.
2.1. Noncorporate taxation of equity incorre.
Owners of corporate equity pay dividend taxes on corporate incorne
if it is distributed or capital gains taxes if it is retained. The rates
at which these taxes are levied depend on the holder. Individuals, for
exanple, pay taxes on dividend incore at regular income tax rates but pay
capital gains taxes at much lower effective rates. Different financial
institutions pay taxes at varying rates on capital :i,ncare. As noted below,
pension incorre is essentially untaxed while certain institutions (e.g. life
lSince the lenders and borrowers are not the sarre individual~, inflation
does cause a redistribution of net incorre arrong individuals and institutions.-14-
insurance companies) actually face higher capital gains tax rates than
dividend tax rates.
The first step in finding the effective tax rate paid on equity
incare is to determine thE distribution of ownership of corPOrate equity.
Table 2 displays the pattern of ownership of corporate equity at the end
of 1976 as refOrted in the official flow of funds accounts prepared by the
Board of Q:)vernors of the Federal Reserve System. The bulk of the equity
is held by households with significant fractions held by pension funds and
life insurance companies. A small fOrtion is held by other financial
institutions. The second and tli.hd columns' ofthe table indicate the marginal
tax rates on dividends and capital gains for each tyPe of stockowner. We
asst:me that retained earnings are taxed at the capital gains tax rate.
1
We estimate that under 1976 law, the average marginal tax rate on
2 individual dividend receipts was 39 percent.
Individual capital gains are taxed at half the statutory rate on
dividends. However, gains are taxed only if realized and the effective
rate is reduced by the postfOnement of realization.
3
lAssuming retained earnings to be taxed at the capital gains rate involves
the implicit assumption that each dollar of retained' earnings raises share
prices by $1.00. Although Bradford (1977) and Auerbach (1977) have
challenged this assumption by suggesting that the existing tax rules and
dividends make the equilibrium value of retained earnings less than one,
the possibility of distributing the corPOrate net worr.h through mergers and
stock repurchases implies that even existing tax rules do not keep the
value of retained earnings below one. While the issue is still in flux,
we adopt the traditional assumption that each dollar of retained earnings
raises the share prices by $1.00.
2'Ihe marginal tax rate was found by using the NBER' s 'l;ro{SIlYJrrodel to estimate
the additional tax payrrents arising fran a 1% increaSe in dividend payrrents.
The TliiXSliMl't'K:DdELlis described in Feldstein and Frisch (1977). we allow
for an estimated 7% of equity held by institutions which are not taxed
but which are included by the flow of funds statistics in the household
sector; this estimate of institutional ownership is derived fran the
SEC Statistical Bulletin.
3Individuals wh::> realize capital gains are taxed on the gain-which occurred
while they were holding the asset. Hence capital gains which accrue on
assets which are passed at death completely avoid taxation. This is be-
cause the new owner is pennitted to "step up" his basis for future tax
liabilities.-15-
TABLE 2
Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Dividends and Capital Gains
Tax Rates On
Class of Investor Value of Holdings Dividends Capital Gains
($ billions)
Households 5E;6.4 .39 .05
Pension Fundsa ·112.9 0 0
Life Insurance' 34.3 .072 .15
Other Insurance 17.1 .072 .15
Mutual Banks 4.4 .072 .15
Commercial Banks .9 .072 .15
Otherb 46.8 0 0 ---
Total 7fi2.8 .287 .047
Source: Flow of Funds Data for 1976. Tax rate calculations are described in
the text. Note that tax rates represent conservative assumptions
rather than estimates of most likely values.
aIncludes both private pensions and the retirement funds of state
and local government.
bComprised primarily of foreign holdings.-16-
Bailey (1968) has estimated that each of these factors
approximately halves the effective tax rate on capital gains. Hence
we assurre a 5% tax rate on capital gains. This estimate is conservative
because we ignore the'taxespaid underthe min.i.mum tax and preference ineare
provisiOOS ofthe tax law.
We assurre that no taxes are levied on the equity ineare of Pension
funds. In fact, PenSion recipients do pay taxes on· Pension ineare upon
receipt. The effective rate is low, however, because the tax liability
is postponed and because the receipients generally hcive low marginal
tax rates during retirenent. M:>reover, increased Pension returns may be
associated with reduced employer contributions rather than increased
benefits. In order to be conservative in our estimate of the effective
tax rate on capital incare, we assurre a zero effective tax rate on Pension
. 1 meare.
Life insurance cx::JJq?a!lies and cormercial banks are taxed at corporate
tax rates on dividends and capital gains. They are pennitted to exclude
85% of dividends because of the intercorporate dividend exclusion. Hence,
their effective marginal tax rate on dividend incorrie is 7.2%.2 These
institutions are taxed at a 30% statutory rate on capital gains realizations.
We assurre an effective rate of 15% on such gains because of the effect of
deferral. Unlike our treatrrent of individuals, we assurre that all gains
1
It can be argued that the tax treatrrent of Pension incorre is equivalent
to a consumption tax because incorre put into Pensions escapes all tax
until the Pension is withdrawn and _pr~~umably consurred. .On thil? view,
the effective tax rate on Pension dividend and interest illcome lS zero.
2This overstates the dividend tax rate for insurance companies because of
the special rules applying to insurance corrpanies.-17-
are eventually realized.
A weighted average of the effective tax rates provides our es-
tiroates of the overall marginal effective rates on dividends and retained
earnings. In order to detennine the noncorporate tax rate on all
equity inCOIre, it is necessary to detennine how corporate profits are
divided between dividends and retained earnings. We estimate this
1
payout ratio by using the average payout .ratio over the past decade.
'!he share of total profits going to dividends over this period was
46.1 percent, implying an overall tax rate on equity incorre of 15.T per cent.
using this figure it is possible to find the total tax increase
on equity due to a misrreasurem:mt of corporate profits. Suppose that
corporate taxable incare is increased by a single dollar with no change
in real incare. '!he corporation pays 48 cents nore in taxes. Shareholder
incare in the fonn of dividends and retained earnings is reduced by
48 cents, leading to a decline of 7.6 cents in shareholder tax payments.
Hence, total' tax payrrents rise by 40.4 cents. '!hus, the marginal tax rate
on misrreasured inCOIre is 40.4%. calculations of the increase in corporate -taxes
due to historical cost depreciation or false inventory accounting overstate
by about 20% the true additional burden on the suppliers of equity capital.
lIn calculating the payout ratio, profits are adjusted for inflation effects
on inventory and depreciation and on real indebtedness. We implicity
assume that there are no "clientele" effects, so that payout ratio is the
same for the equity owned by different classes of investors. Blurre et al
(1974) provide empirical support for this assumption.-18-
2. 2. The Value of Corporate interest 03ductions.
CoI"f:X)rations are pe:'TIUtted to deduct nominal rather than
real interest payrrents. Increases in inflation raise the coI"f:X)rations'
interest deductions, thereby reducing cOI"f:X)rate tax liabilities. Although
the coI"f:X)rate tax rate is 48%, t 1e-overstatetrentQf'lnterestexpenses reduces
total tax payrrents py less than 18%. This occurs because the increase
in after-tax coI"f:X)rate incOtre re3ults in an increase in noncorporate
tax payrrents on dividends and capital gains. In t.n.e preceding section
2.1, we showed that the effective marginal tax rate on dividends and retentions
is 15.7 percent; Le., it was derronstrated that the equity owners' tax rate
on "misrreasuro':''' corporate incop€ was 40.4 percent. This is the correct
rreasure of the reduction in tax liabilities due to the deduction of nominal
interest. It is this 40.4 percEnt rate that can be compared to the
marginal tax rate of cOI"f:X)rate debt holders in order to determine the
effect of inflation on the taxation of interest income and expenses.
In the next part of this section we consider the extra tax paid by the
holders of corporate debt.
2. 3• The Tax on CoI"f:X)rateI:Ebt Holders.
We now examine the extra taxes that the holders of cOI"f:X)rate
debt pay when interest rates rise in response to a higher rate of inflation.
Equivalently, we estimate the arrolIDt by whichtheir:-taxeSlwt!lulabe reduced
if the taxation of interest income were indexed. ~ve also examine the
extra taxes corporations pay on their interest bearing financial assets.
In Table 3 we display the nonfinancial coI"f:X)rate sectors interest bearing
financial assets and liabilities. The holders of these securities are
shO\VI1 in the different colUI'llr1s. These figures are derived directly from the
official flow of funds accounts. The penultimate 'row provides the net corporateTnhle ) -- ._.~ --
The OiRtrib"t!oll of the Nominlll. ARR('ts Rnd Llal>llttle" of Nonflnaoclnl. Corporations
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debt holdings of each class of investor, fonred by aggregating the
entries in the aolunn. In order to calculate the effective tax rate
on'the holders of corporate debt, we find the weighted average of
I1\3rginal tax ratesfor each investor class.
Before describing our estimates of the specific marginal tax
rates, several features of Table 3 deserve corment. First, IIDst
aorporate debt is not in the form of bonds. Nearly half is canprised
of bankborrDwing and mortgages. Second, only a small proportion of
aorporate interest paynents, less than 15%, goes to individuals. The
1argestpot:!=ion goes to ccmnercial banks. 'Ihird, it is inportant to
recall that corporations themselves hold a large quantity of interest
bearing financial assets. Inflation leads to the increased tax liabilities
on increased inCCl'OO fran these assets.1
our· estimate of the marginal tax rate facing each class of creditors
is shown in the botton row of Table 3. 'Ihese estimates are only approximate
since the laws governing financial institutions are quite ccmplex and since
all of the desired infonnation is not available. Fortunately, the esti-
mates that are rrost uncertain generally apply to only small quantities of
debt. When in doubt, we have selected relatively aonservative assurrptions.
The rationale for each of our estimates now follows:
lIn SOIre cases this leads to deductions for the issuers of the assets.-21-
Households: According to the NBER TAXSTI-1 m:x1el, the weighted average of
the marginal tax rates on interest incOIre is about 25 percent. Havvever,
this average includes bank dep:>sit interest as well as interest on
corporate securities. Since corpo:r:rte bonds are held by nore affluent
taxpayers than ordinary bank accounttirre dep:>sits (see Projector
and Weiss 1 1966), the 25 percent overall figures for all interest payrrents
is too low. We have selected a 35 percent tax rate on interest paid, thereby
implying that household bondholders have lower marginal tax rates on average
than household dividend recipients.
Pensions: 'Ihese are conservatively treated as fully tax exempt, implying a
zero marginal tax rate.
CoJ.'mercial Banks: Ccmrercial banks pay a 48 percent corporate incorre tax
at the margin on interest receipts. 'Ihose interest re~ipts net of corporate
tax are then subject to further taxes as dividends and retained earningsi we
assure the sarre 15.7 Fercent rate for this equity income that we derived
in section 2.1 for the equity incorre of nonfinancial corporations. combining
the 48 percent and the 15.7 percent implies an overall tax on this equity incorre
of 56.1. However, When the interest rates that banks charge rise, banks also
raise the interest payrrents\ that they make to their dep:>sitors. 'Ib the
extent that these interest payrrents rise, the banks do not pay extra taxes
but their dep:>sitors do. Of course, there is no increase in the interest paid
on demand dep:>sits. lrile assure that interest rate ceilings constrain the
increase in other interest rates to 0.3 percent for each one percent increase
in inflation. When this is allowed for, the total marginal tax rate on
1 corporations and their dep:>sitors is approximately 54 Fercent.
l'Ihis assumes that demand dep:>sits account for 38% of total bank liabilities
and that the marginal tax rate on the dep:>sitors at commercial banks is 25
percent.-22-
Mutual Savings Banks. In sorre cases, these banks pay the sane 48 percent
tax as ordinary corporations. However, mutual savings banks ''lith a sufficient
fraction of their assets in the form of local rrortgages are allowed to exclude
a fraction of their portfolio incar€, a fraction that increases with the
rrortgage share. The overall effective rate must also reflect the extent to
which mutual savings banks raise the interest rate they pay and the corresponding
marginal tax rate of their depositors. We estimcl.te a 24 percent overall
rate for these institutions.
Life Insurance Companies: Life insurance companies are taxed according to
the "M=nge Fonnula" or "ten-to-one rule" which allows insurance companies to
exclude a portion of the±r portfolio incx::xre before applying the 48 percent
corporat<~ tax rate (see Hu.eJ:ner, 1976 for a di-scussion of this tax rule) .
The procedure in the existing law is designed to separate investIrent income
into an anount required to rreet the funding requirements for existing insurance
and a residual profit that is deerred taxable. 'Ib achieve this, life insurance
companies pay tax on a percentage of incorre equal to ten ti.rres the difference
between the average nominal yield on the portfolio (i) and the nominal yield
that the insurance carnmissioners deem to be the appropriately conservative
yield to use in calculating required reserves(s). Thus if the assets of the
insurance company (A) are invested at a nominal yield of i, the total tax
liability of the company is T=O.48LlO(i-sUiA. The change in the effective
tax rate caused by inflation depends on how i and s adjust. As we noted
above,'the nominal market yield (i) generally rises point-for point for
expected inflation. In contrast, the regulatoryauthorities have not altered
s in response to inflation; historically, s has remained close to 3 percent
for the past 70 years. The marginal tax rate implied by this tax fonnula for-23-
increases in the interest rate is an increasing function of the initial
rrarginal tax rate. Evaluating the marginal tax rate at the relatively
1
conservative value of i=0.07 i..nplies a marginal tax rate of 0.57. We
use this value to be conservative; at higher initial interest yields, the
effective marginal tax would be even greater. Note we are also conservative
in ignoring the tax paid on dividends and retained earnings of the non-mutual
life insurance companies.
Finance Companies and other Insurance: These are taxed liked ordinary
corporations. Corrbining the 48 percent corporate rate with the additional
tax on dividends and retained earnings yields an overall marginal tax
rate of 57.1 Percent on this type of incane.
<bveTI'lIrEl1t: We asStmE that goveTI'lIrEl1t neither pays taxes on interest
receipts nor deducts expenses for tax purposes. While increases in interest
receipts may enable goverrurents to reduce other taxes, there is no reason
to suppose that capital taxes will be reduced. M::>reover, other costs
of goveTI'lIrEl1t are increased by raising interest rates.
~te that at i=.07, -a $1,000 portfolio earns $70. '(.<Jith s=.O;3 only 40 percent
of this or $28 is taxed; the tax is $13.44 and the net incane is therefore
$56.56. Raising the interest rate to i=.08"implies earnings of $80 but 50 percent
or $40 is taxable. The tax is thus $19.20, leaving a net income of $60.80.
Note that an extra $10 of gross interest raises net interest incane by only
$4.24. The effective marginal tax rate is thus 57.6 percent.-24-
Miscellaneous: The interest on th~se assets are assumed to be untaxed. Note that
"miscellaneous" includes assets and liabilities of the rest of the world so
our no-tax assumption implies that no taxes are paid to either' the U. S. Or' to
foreign governments by foreigners owning bonds of u.s. cOrpOrations. It is
clear that our asst:UT1f:>tion that all of this incane is untaxed is very conservative.
In order to calculate the marginal tax rate on interest incane,
we have averaged the marginal tax ratES shown in the final raw of Table 3, weight-
ing by the share of debt awned..a::lass of investors share of debt. The results
imply a marginal rate of 0.420 on interest income.
This implies that inflation raises the taxation of interest income,
since the tax rate that lenders pay exceeds that at which corporations
deduct. Allowing in the overall calculation for the impact of inflation' on
debt thus actually strengthens the conclusion that inflation raises the
effective taxation of capital incarre. This effect is, however, quite
small. It is equal to 1.6 percent of net interest payrrents (the difference
between the 42.0 percent of lenders and the 40.4 percent of corporate
borrowers or about a half billion dollars per year.) This is dwarfed by
the depreciation and inventory effects described in the previous section.
While several of our estimated marginal tax rates are only
approximate, they pertain to relatively snaIl arrounts of debt. It is unlikely
that a rrore exact estimate of these n'l.lITbers would alter our basic conclusion
that the tax on those who lendto corporationsisatleast as great as the
rate at-which corporations and their owners can deduct interest payrrents.-25-
3. The Increased Taxation of Corporate Source Income
1
The first section of this paper presented calculations of the excess tax
paid by corporations because of the mismeasurement of depreciation and
inventories. The current section extends that calculation in three significant
ways to obtain the total increased tax on corporations, on equity CMners and on
all sources of capital for nonfinancial corporations.
Our calculations shCM that inflation raised the total tax on the income of
nonfinancial corporations by $32.3 billion. This arvmmt is substantially greater
than the $26.1 billion additional tax paid by cOrPOrations themselves because of the
mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory profits.
This section begins by analyzing the several effects of inflation in 1977.
Estimates for the years since 1954 are then presented.
3.1 An Analysis for 1977
We proceed in three steps to calculate the total excess taxes on corporate
source income in 1977. We first calculate the excess tax paid by the cor-
poration itself, recognizing the effect of not taxing the real·gains on debt as
well as the effect on depreciation and inventory profits. We then extend this
to obtain the total excess tax paid by equity CMners, including the effect on
the tax liabilities of the corporations and the shareholders. Finally, we
extend the calculation to the total excess tax including the tax paid by those
who lend to the nonfinancial corporations.
The calculations in section 1 shCMed that historic cost depreciation and
the existing inventory accounting practices added $ 26.1 billion to the 1977 tax
liabilities of nonfinancial corporations. In 1977 these corporations had net
lThroughout this section the term "excess taxation" refers to the addi-
tional taxes paid because of inflation.-26-
interest bearing liabilitiesl of $ 592.2 billion and non-interest bearing
assets (primarily cash and net accounts receivable2) of $ 130.9 billion. The-ir
net nominal liabilities were thus $ 461.3 billion. Since the 1977 inflation
rate was 6.8 percent (the December to December increase in the Cpr), these
corporations had a real gain of $ 31. 1+billion on their net liabilities. Excluding
the gain from the corporations' taxable income saved them $ 15.1 billion in
corporate tax. These tax savings thus offset approximately one-half of the
$ 26.0 billion of extra tax caused by the existing tax treatment of
inventories and debt. Inflation caused corporations to pay an extra tax of
$ 11.0 billion in 1977.
The extra tax paid by the equity owners of the corporations differs in
two ways from the extra tax paid by the corporations. First, as we
discussed earlier, the extra tax paid a: the corporate level leaves less
income to be taxed as dividends. With a dividend payout rate of 0.46 and
effective marginal tax rates of .287 on dividends and 0.047 on retained ear-
nings, the $ 11.0 billion of extra corporate tax reduces shareholders own
taxes by $ 1.7 billion. Second, the shareholders IIDlSt eventually pay capi-
tal gain tax on the nominal increase in the market value of the company that
results from inflation. Since this n~ninal increase in value is over and
above the real increase due to retained earnings the extra tax paid on this
nominal gain represents an unwarranted extra tax. We shall assume that the
ratio of the market value to the real value of the corporation remains
constant and that the nominal gain can be approximated by the product of the
ISee section 2 for a description of the composition of this net amount.
Note that $ 592.2 billion is net of the interest bearing assets of these firms.
2These assets also include Treasury bills and other federal government
securities that bear interest since the important distinguishing feature of
these "non-interest bearing assets" is that private individuals and institutions
do not pay any interest on them.-27-
inflation rate and the real value of oorporate assets.! The relevant
marginal rate of tax on these accrued nominal gains is the effective capital
gains tax rate of 0.047. The real value of the physical assets of these
corporations (plant and equipment, inventories and land)2 in 1977 was
$1,68Lf billion. The inflation rate of 6.8 percent and the tax rate of 0.047
imply an additional capital gain tax of $ 5.3 billion. 'The tota1 excess tax
on the equity owners of the nonfinancial oorporations is therefore the sum
of three terms: the $·11.0 billion of extra oorporate income tax minus the
$ 1.7 billion resulting reduction in personal taxes plus the capital gains
tax of $ 5.3 billion. Inflation thus induced a net extra tax of $ 14.6
billion on ooporations and their owners in 1977.
To obtain the total excess taxation of oorporate source income that is
caused by inflation, the overtaxation of ooporate creditors must be added to
this $ 14.6 billion. .The f!et financial capital supplied by the creditors of
these corporations was $ 595.2 billion.3 The inflation rate of 6.8 per-
cent imposed a real loss of $ 40.3·billion that should have been offset
against the interest income of the creditors. The effective marginal tax
rate of 0.420 on interest inoome implies an excess taxation of $ 17.7
billion.
Combining this $17.7 billion with the $14.6 billion implies an excess tax
on corporations and their owners that yields a total excess tax on corporate
source income of $32.3
-----~e actual nominal gain ca~sed by inflation is very hard to disengage
from other changes in market value. Theoretical oonsiderations imp~y that a
change in the expected rate of inflation will cause an inverse change in the
market valuation ratio which then slowly returns to its equilibrium value (See
Feldstein, 1978).
2The data came from Von, Furstenberg (1977).
3we ignore the corpOrate assets in the form of government securities and
net accounts receivable because these do not represent the supply of financial
capital by private investors.-28-
billion. This excess tax on corporate source income was 54 percent of the
corporate income tax liabilities of $ 59.0 billion and 35.0 percent of the
combined corporate, shareholder and lender tax liabilities of $ 93 billion.
Stated in yet a different way, the excess tc:iX of $32.3 billion caused by
inflation is equivalent to an additional wealth tax or capital levy of 2 percent
on the real corporate assets of $ l68li billion. Since these corporations earn
1
between 10 and 12 percent on their real assets ,this extra tax absorbs
between one-sixth and one-fifth of pretax real earnings.
3.2 The Period Since 1954
This same framework can be used to calculate the excess tax caused by
inflation in each year since 1954. Since we do not have a detailed flow of
funds calculation of the sort presented in section 2 for each year, we shall
use the same effective marginal tax rates for all years. The calculations
therefore represent the excess tax that would have been caused for each year
if the 1976 statutory tax rates and composition of creditors and debtors had
prevailed; differences due to using actual statutory rates and ownership
information would be small relative to the differences 'over time caused by
the changing history of inflation.
Table 4 traces the evolution of the inflation-generated excess taxation
of corporate source income between 1954 and 1977. Column 2 repeats the
figures from Table 1, column 7, of the excess tax at the corporate level due
to the mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory profits. The corporate
tax savings due to ignoring the real gains on net corporate debt are pre-
sented in column 3. It is worth noting that the excess tax due to the
mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory profits always exceeds the tax
savings on the debt gains. The net excess at the corporate level, presented
ISee Feldstein and Summers (1977).TABLE 4
Changes in Tax Liabilities on Corporate Source Income Caused by Inflation, 1954-77
~illions of Dollar~
Year Inflation Corporations Shareholders Equity Creditors Total Excess
Rate Capital Corporate Tax as
Depreciation Net Total Dividends Nominal Net Capital Percent
and Debt and Capital Corporate of Corporate
Inventories Retained Gains Interest Income Tax
Earnings
(1) (2 ) (3 ) (4) (5 ) (6) (7) (8 ) (9) (10 )
1954 -0.5 2.4 0.1 2.5 -0.4 -0.1 2.0 -0.1 1.9 12.2
1955 0.4 3.2 -0.1 3.1 -0.4 0.1 2.8 0.1 2.9 14.4
1956 2.9 4.2 -0.5 3.7 -0.5 0.5 3.7 1.0 4.7 23.4 I
1957 3.0 3.9 -0.7 3.2 -0.4 0.6 3.4 1.2 4.6 24.1
N
\.0
1958 1.8 3.3 -0.5 2.8 -0.4 0.3 2.7 0.8 3.5 21.6
I
1959 1.5 3.3 -0.4 2.9 -0.4 0.3 2.8 0.7 3.5 16.9
1960 1.5 3.1 -0.4 2.7 -0.4 0.3 2.6 0.8 3.4 17.7
1961 0.7 2.6 -0.3 2.3 -0.4 0.2 2.1 0.4 2·5 12.8
1962 1.2 2.3 -0.5 1.8 -0.3 0.2 1.7 0.7 2.4 11.6
1963 1.6 2.2 -0.7 1.5 -0.2 0.4 1.7 1.1 2.8 12.3
1964 1.2 2.2 -0.5 1.7 -0.3 0.3 1.7 0.9 2.6 10.8
1965 1.9 2.7 -1.0 1.7 -0.3 0.5 1.9 1.5 3.4 12.5
1966 3.4 3.0 -2.0 1.0 -0.2 0.9 1.7 2.9 4.6 15.6
1967 3.0 3.3 -2.1 1.2 -0.2 1.0 2.0 2.9 4.9 17.7
1968 4.7 5.0 -3.8 1.2 -0.2 1.6 2.6 4.9 7.5 22.3
1969 6.1 7.0 -5.5 1.5 -0.2 2.9 4.2 [.2 11.4 34.2
1970 5.5 7.3 -5.8 1.5 --0.2 2.3 3.6 7.3 10·9 39.9
1971 3.4 4.9 -4.1 3.8 -0.5 1.5 4.8 5.0 9.8 32.8
1972 3.4 9.2 -4.5 4.7 -0.8 1.6 4.5 5.4 9·9 29.5
1973 8.8 15.8 -12.9 2.9 -0.4 4.5 7.0 15.7 22.7 57.3
1974 12.2 29.7 -21.0 8.7 -1.3 7.2 15.6 25.0 40.6 95.1
1975 7.0 21.3 -14.5 6.8 -1.1 4.8 10.5 16.7 27.2 66.6
1976 4.8 24.1 -10.2 13.9 -2.2 3.6 15.3 11.9 27.2 56.5
1977 6.8 26.1 -15.1 11.0 -1.7 5.3 14.6 17.7 32.3 54.3
See text for definitions and method of calculation.-30-
in column 4, remains relatively low (less than $ 5 billion) until 1974 when
it jumped to $ 8.7 billion.
The reduced taxation of dividends and retained earnings due to higher
corporate tax payments is shown in column 5 and the capital gains tax
liability on the nominal capital gains caused by inflation is shown in
column 6. Combining columns 4, 5, and 6 gives the net increase in the taxation
of equity capital presented in column 7. This excess tax on equity income
remained less the $ 5 billion until 1970 but has exceeded $ 10 billion annually
since 1974. The excess tax on equity income since 1970 has totalled more than
$ 80 billion.
Column 8 presents the very important excess tax on the individuals and
institutions that provide debt capital to the nonfinancial corporations. This
excess tax on lenders reached $ 5.0 billion in 1968 and exceeded $ 15 billion in
1973. The excess tax on those who lent to nonfinancial corporations has
exceeded over $ 100 billion in the brief period from 1970 to 1977.
The total excess tax on corporate source income caused by inflation is
shown in column 9. Three things should be noted about these figures. First,
this total excess tax caused by inflation exceeds the excess tax paid by cor-
porations because of the mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory profits
(column 2). FOcusing exclusively on the extra corporate taxes paid because of
the mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory profits is therefore a conser-
vative evaluation of the total inflationary bnpact. Second, the total excess
tax remained less than $ 5 billion a year until 1966, doubled by 1970 and then
doubled again by 1973. The excess tax has exceeded $ 20 billion a year since
1973. Third, the total excess tax on coqx>rate source income has exceeded $ 180
billion in the period between 1970 and 1977.-31-
Finally, column 10 states the total excess tax on corporate source income
as a percentage of the corporate tax liability. Although the excess tax
remained less than one-sixth of corporate income tax payments until the
mid-1960's, it then quickly rose to more than one-third of the corporate income
tax. For the final five years, the excess tax payments have been more than 50
percent of corporate tax liabilities.-32-
4. The Effective Tax Rate on Corporate Source Income
This section presents our estimates of the total effective tax
rate on the real capital income earned in the cOrPOrate sector. Our
calculations show that the total tax on corporate source incorre in 1977,
including the tax liabilities of shareholders and lenders as well as of
the corporations themselves,· was $ 91.8 billion, an effective tax rate
of 67 percent on the real pretax incane of the nonfinancial corPOrate
sector. The data shov.7 that this 67 percent represents a substantial increase
in the effective tax rate over the past decade and a return to the effective
tax rates of the mid-1950's.
The substantial increase in the effective tax rate despite statutory
reductions reflects the i.:rrpact of inflation. The $32.3 billion of extra tax
caused by inflation in 1977 accounts for rrore than one-third of the total tax
on corporate source incare, raising the effective total tax rate from 43 Percent
to 66 percent. The extra tax caused by inflation has thus offset all of the
accelerated depreciation and other legislated tax reductions during the past
two decades.
4.1 The Effective Tax Rate in 1977
The best rreasure of the tax burden on corPOrate source incorre is the
ratio of the total tax Paid on such incorre - including the taxes paid by share-
holders and lenders as well as by the corPOrations - to the total real incorre
available before tax for the shareholders and creditors. The official national
incane estimate of 1977 profits with the inventory valuation adjustment and
capital consumption adjustrrent was $113.9 billion. Net nominal interest paYrrents
.by nonfinancial cOrPOrations were $33.7 billion. It seems at first that the
total pretax income available for shareholder ,and creditors could be obtained-33-
by simply adding these adjusted profits and net interest on the grOl.md$
that it isunnecessary to adjust interest payn:ents for inflation since any
correction to naninal interest expenses by the corporation would require
an equal correction to nominal receipts by creditors. Aithough this is
a generally co~ect principle, one further m:xlification is required. A
significant fraction of the corporations' financial assets are not liabilities
of investors but of the governrrent or of the corporations' custaners. Hhen
inflation lowers the real value of these assets, the loss to the corporations
is a gain to the governrrent and to the corporations' custaners and not to
individual or institutional investors. The corporations' loss on these
financial assets should therefore be subtracted from other corporate profits.
In 1977, these assets were $130.9 billion; the inflationary loss was therefore
$8.9 billion. The 1977 total pretax corporate sector income available for
shareholders and creditors was therefore $138.7 billion.
Our estimated total tax of $91.8 billion on this inCOll'e consists of
five components. (1) The largest of these is the corporate incane tax payrrents
of $59.0 billion. This alone represents an effective tax rate of 42.5 percent
on total corporate source inCOll'e. (2) Dividends in 1977 were $39.1 billion; an
effective tax rate of 0.287 on dividends implies a tax liability of $1,1.2
1 billion and adds 8.1 percent to the effective tax rate. (3) The national income
account estimate of $16.0 billion of retained earnings2 ignores the real gain
on outstanding debt. With a net debt of $461.3 billion and a 6.8 percent
inflation rate, the additional real retained earnings were $31.4 billion.
lThis calculation uses our estimated marginal tax rate on dividends to :rreasure the
average tax rate on dividends. This causes an overstatement of the tax
liability but the error is likely to be very small.
2This is the official figure for undistributed profits corrected for the
inventory valuation and capital consumption adjust::rrents.-34-
The total retained earnings of $47.4 billion are eventually subject to
capital gains taxation with an effective tax rate of 0.047; this adds
$2.2 billion to the total tax and 1.6 percent to the effective tax rate.
(4) An additional~ _ capitalgains, ,taxliability results from the nominal
increase in the value of corporate assets that accarpanies a general rise
in the price level. We abstract fran the particular market fluctuations
of 1977 and calculate that the real capital st.ock with an initial value of
$1,684 billion rose by 6.8 percent. With a tax rate of4.7 percent, this
naninal increase implies an effective tax of $5.4 billion, adding 3.9 percent
to the total effective tax rate. (5) Finally, the nominal interest payrrents
of $33.7 billion were taxable incane of the creditors. With a tax rate of
0.42, these interest percents involve a tax liability of $14.2 billion, adding
10.2 percent to the effective tax rate.2 The total of these five figures
of tax payments is thus' $92.0 billion for a total effective tax rate of
66.3 percent.
Before turning to a comparison of 1977 with earlier years, it is useful
to contrast the actual effective tax rate of 66.3 percent with several alterna-
tive rates that are frequently cited. Perhaps the rrost comrron measure of
the corporate tax burden is the ratio of the $59.0 billion corporate incorre
tax to the conventionally rreasured corporate profits of $143.5 billion;
the resulting rate af 4i.l is a gross underestimate of the actual'total rate.
An alternative and rrore sophisticated rate is the ratio. of the corporate
~e are again using an estimated marginal tax rate as an average tax rate
on this incorre. This causes serre overstatement, particularly for life
insurance canpanies. Adjusting this to use an average rather than marginal
taxLrate for life'insurance campa:hies might reduce the tax by up to $2 billion
dollars.-35-
incorre tax to the sum of 9Orporate profits with the inventory valuation
and capital consumption adjustrnents ($113.9 billion) plus the real gains
on the net corporate debt ($31.4 billion) i the resulting ratio of 40.6
percent is again less than two thirds of the total burden. These
calculations underline the imp:)rtance of looking beyond the corporation
to the shareholders and creditors in order to obtain a correct picture of
total tax burdens on capital used in the corporate sector.
4.2 Variations in the Effective 'Ibtal Tax Rate Since 1954
Table 5 traces the variations in the effective total tax rate
on corporate capital since 1954. The total real incOme presented in
column 1 is the sum of real profits as rreasured by the national incorre
statistics and net nominal interest paym2l1.ts with an adjuSbnent for corporate
losses on gove:rnrrent assets and net accounts receivable.
Actual corporate tax liabilities as a percentage of this total
real incorre have declined nearly one fifth since the mid-1950's. ~breover,
there has been no increase at all in this ratio between 1970 and 1977.
The varying taxes on shareholders and creditors in columns 3 through
6 reflect variations in dividends, full retained earnings, inflationary
appreciation, and interest paym2l1.ts. The same 197 7effective tax rates are
ass'l.llred for each tax base; allowing for statutory changes would raise taxes
on dividends and interest inC()f(E in the earlier years and reduce the taxes
on retained earnings and inflationary appreciation in those years but these
effects would be relatively small.
The net result of these char:lges is shown in the total effective
tax rate presented in column 7. Despite the decline in the relative corporateTABLE 5
The Effective Tax Rate on Capital Income of the Nonfinancial Corporate Sector




Corporate Taxes on Shareholders and Creditors Total
Dollars) Income
Tax Dividends Real Nominal Interest
Retained Capital Income
Earnings Appreciation
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5) (6) (7)
1954 $ 30.4 51.6 7.8 2.0 -0.2 2.3 63.5
1955 39.8 51.1 6.8 2.1 0.2 1.8 61.9
I
(,N
1956 36.5 54.8 8.0 2.1 1.3 2.1 68.h 0'
I
1957 35.6 53.4 8.6 2.3 1.6 2.7 68.5
1958 31.8 50.6 9.3 2.2 1.1 3.7 67.0
1959 42.0 49.2 7.4 2.2 0.7 3.3 62.8
1960 40.2 47.7 8.3 2.2 0.7 3.8 62.8
1961 41.1 47.4 8.3 2.1 0.3 4.2 62.2
1962 48.7 42.4 7.6 2.4 0.6 4.1 57.1
1963 53.8 42.4 7.6 2.5 0.7 3.9 57.1
1964 61.2 39.1 7.3 2.6 0.5 3.8 53.3
1965 70.9 38.3 7.1 2.7 0.7 3.8 52~5
1966 76.2 38.7 6.9 2.8 1.2 4.3 53.9
1967 73.8 37.5 7.4 2.8 1.3 5.2 54.2
1968 78.7 42.7 7.6 2.8 2.0 5.6 60.8
1969 74.9 44.5 8.0 2.8 3.0 7.7 66.0
1970 64.2 42.5 9.0 1.2 3.5 11.7 67.8
1971 73.7 40.5 7.9 1.1 2.1 10.7 62.3
1972 88.0 38.0 7.2 1.4 1.8 9.6 58.0
1973 90.2 43.9 7.7 2.1 5.0 11.3 70.0
1974 76.2 56.0 10.0 2.1 9.4 17.2 94.9
1975 100.2 40.8 8.4 1.7 4.8 13.6 69.3
1976 126.3 42.5 7.4 1.4 2.9 10.7 64.9
1977 138.7 42.5 8.1 1.6 3.9 10.2 66.3
See text for definitions and method of calculation.-37-
tax payrrents, the overall effective tax rate is as high now as it was in the
mid-1950's. The effect of inflation has been powerful enough to offset
the introduction of the inves1::Irent tax credit, the cuts in the corporate
tax rate, and the rrore rapid acceleration of depreciation.-38-
5. Inflation and Corporate Tax Liabilities in Two-Digit r.1a.nufacturing Industries
Although historic cost depreciation and existing accounting practices
raise the tax liabilities of all corporations,.their :i.rnpJrtance varies sub-
stantially arrong different industries. The current section presents informa-
tion for each of the twenty 2-digit manufacturing industries. For manufacturing
as a Whole, the additional taxes in 1976 c~used by historic cost depreciation
and existing accounting practices accounted for slightly nore than half of all
the federal tax liabilities of these finns. These additional taxes varied
from less than 25 percent of actual taxes in a few industries to 100 percent
of the taxes Paid in several others. If the taxes are expressed as a percentage
of the real value of capital used in these industries, the additional tax
varies from less than one percent of capital to nearly three percent of
capital. The very high tax rates that result in several of the industries
make,' it particularly difficult for them to compete for capital. If these
additional tax burdens persist, the allocation of capital among manufacturing
industries vvill be substantially distorted by inflation.
Our analysi$ of the additional tax burdens of individual in-
dustries is based on information supplied by individual firms in their
annual reports and lO-K fonus. Beginning with 1976, the Securities
.and Exchange Camnission has required the largest finns to supply in-
formation on replacement cost depreciation and on inflation-adjusted
inventory gains as well as on historic cost depreciation and on their
inventory profits as they are used for tax PUrposes. We use the differences
between the inflation-adjusted and the unadjusted figures for depreciation
and inventories to measure the overstatement of taxable profits. For each-39-
industry, we then compare the total additional tax liabilities implied by
these overstated profits with the actual tax liabilities paid by the finns
in our sample. We also calculate the additional tax payrrents as a
percentage of the real value of the capital used by the sample finns
in the industry.1 . Finally, we use the'ratio of sales by the sample finns
to sales by all fi:r:msin the industry to estimate the total additional taxes
caused in each industry in 1976 by historic cost depreciation and by prevailing
accounting rrethods.
AI.though the general approach of these calculations parallels
.the analysis of section 1, the~e are several differences that should'be
borne in mind in inte:rpreting the results. First, the infonnation supplied
by the fi:r:ms represents consolidated accounts and not just the darestic
activities that were analyzed in section 1. Because -we are forced to
include the overseas depreciation and inventory gains, we overstate the
extent of overtaxation. Second, the firms provide the historic cost , .
depreciation and replacerrent cost depreciation as altemative measures of
"book" depreciation rather than "tax'" depreciation. Since the straight-line
"book" depreciation is less than the accelerated "tax" depreciation, this
procedure causes us to understate the extent of overtaxation. The net
effect of these two countervailing biases cannot be detennined from the
existing data but is unlikely to be large enough to distort the conclusions
of the analysis.
The sample of firms for which we have infonnation represents
approximately 50 percent of the total sales of manufacturing firms. Because
~stimates of the replacerrent cost value of plant, equipment and inventories
are also required by the SEC.--40-
of the nature of the S.E.C. requirenent, the sample consists exclusively
of large firms. M)reover, the coverage varies substantially am:mg the
industries with a very much smaller fraction of sales in the samples for
some industries than for others. The tables in this section indicate
the nurriber of firms in each sample and the fraction of sales that the
sample firms represent.l
Table 6 presents information on the extent of reduced
depreciation and the consequent additional taxation. The first two colUIl'U1s
show the number of firms in the sample and the percentage of the total
industry sales accounted for by the sample firms. The third colUIl'U1 shows
the understaterrent of depreciation, i.e., the difference between replacement
cost depreciation and historic cost depreciation. The additional tax
liability presented in colUIl'U1 4 is calculated by surrming (for all the sample
firms in the industry) 0.48 t..i.rres each firm's understatErldepreciation up to
the limit of the tax actually Paia by the firm. Note that this is a very
conservative staterrent of the additional tax for any firm in which the
limit constrains our calculated arrount because it assumes that no additional
profits would have been earned even at a zero tax rate and disregards the
possibility of loss carry forwards. ColUIl'U1 5 expresses the additional tax
as a percentage of the total federal tax liability of the firms in the sample
while colUIl'U1 6 states the additional tax liability as a percentage of the
replacement cost value of the firms' real capital stock.2 The remaining two
l'Ib estina:letotalsales in each industry, we use the eampustat file of
2500 firms prepared by Standard and Poors. The 1332 manufacturing firms
in this file represent 1976 sales of $1,052 billion or 87 percent of all
manufacturing sales as estimated by the Federal Trade Conmission. We use the
Campustat file to estimate total sales by industry in order to be sure that
firms are classified by industry in the sarre v-Jay as in our replacement cost
sample.
2The.real capital stock includes inventories as well as property, plant and
equiprrEnt but excludes financial assets and liabilities.TABLE 6
Inflation, Depreciation and Corporate Tax Liabilities in r~nufacturing Industries
Sample Firms Estimated Industry Totals
S.LC. (1) (2 ) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Code Industry N Sales Reduced Additional Additional Taxes as Reduced Additional
Coverage Depreciation T.axes Percent of: Depreciation taxes
Actual Replacement
Taxes Value of
(percent) ($Million) ($Million) Paid Capital ($I'lillion) ($Million)
20 Food &Kindred
Products 28 45 574 275 24.4 1.3 1282 615
21 Cigars and
Cigarettes 6 70 139 37 12.1 .7 196 94
22 Textile Mill






Finished products 6 22 14 7 12.2 .6 64 31
24 Lumber and
Products 6 83 683 252 100.0 2.5 825 304
25 Furniture &
Fixtures 4 69 15 7 28 .9 23 11
26 Paper &
Products 20 70 670 322 87 2.0 960 461
27 Publications &
Printing 12 50 89 43 16 1.5 178 85
28 Chemicals &
Products 43 62 1266 608 34 1.3 2039 979
29 Petroleum
Products 22 49 2241 1076 53 1.3 4543 2180
Table 6 contim~es on next pageTable 6 Continued
Inflation, Depreciation and Corporate Tax Liabilities in Manufacturing Industries






























































































































All figures refer to 1976. The number of firms in the sample for each industry is shown in column 1; these firms account for
the percentage of industry sales in column 2. See text for definitions and methods.-43-
columns are estimates for all the finns in the industry and not just the
sanple; they are obtained by rescaling the sanple values for each industry
by the ratio of total industry sales to sales in the sample.
The related importance of the additional taxes that resulted from the
understatement of depreciation varied substantially arcong the 20 inGlividual fudus-
tries. Column 5 shows that these additional taxes repJ;:'esented less than on-sixth
of actual 1976 tax liabilities in six of the twenty industries. These are
primarily non-durable goods (tobacco, apparel, printing and publishing, and
leather and footwear) but also include the non-electrical machinery and
instruments industries). At the other extreme, there are four industries
in which the additional tax represents rrore than three-fourths of actual
tax liabilities: primary metals, rubber, paper, and wood products.
A similar picture of very substantial variation emerges when the
additional taxation is related to the replacement cost value of the finns'
real capital stock (column 6). The additional tax varies fran 0.4 percent
1
of the real capital stock in the primary metals industry and·0.5 percent
in the non-electrical machinery industry to 2.0 percent in the paper in-.
dustry and 2.4 percent in the wood products industry.
Fbr :m::mufacturing as a whole, the reduction in real depreciation
totalled $18.0 billion or half of the reduction for all nonfinancial corpora-
tions that was discussed in section 1. Nondurable goods industries (SIC codes
20 through 29) accounted for 58 percent of this reduced depreciation or $10.4
billion. Reduced depreciation in durable goods industries (SIC codes 30 through
39. was $7.6 billion. The additional tax caused by the understatement of
IT.his tax is kept so low because the extra tax is assurred to be no greater than
actual taxes paid which, in the case of primary metals, were kept low by ex-
tremely 10\\7 real profits.-44-
depreciation was $7.6 billion, of which $4.9 billion was in nondurable
goods industries and $2.7 billion was in durable'.goods industries.
Table 7 presents the combined effects of reduced depreciation
and overstated inventory profits. The organization of the table Parallels
that of Table 6. The results presented in coltnTln 5 shCM very substantial
variation arrong industries in the importance of the extra tax as a percentage
of actual taxes Paid. In two of the industries (leather and non-electrical
machinery), the extra tax arrounted to less than 25 percent of the actual
tax Paid. In contrast, four of the industries (wood and wood products; paper;
rubber; and steel) would have paid no tax if depreciation had been calculated
at replacement cost and if the artificial inventory profits were also
eliminated. ColtnTln 6 confinns the picture of substantial variation arrong
industries by canparing the additional tax to the replacement value of the
real capital stock. The extra tax paid (as limited by the total tax paid)
varied fran less than one Percent of the capital stock on the primary metals and
non-electrical machinery industries to nearly three percent of the capital
stock in the food industry and in textiles.
For all manufacturing industries, the mismeasurerrent of depreciation
and inventories totaled $27.1 billion or 54 percent of the aggregate reported
for all nonfinancial corporations in section 1. "Of this $27.1 billion total,
58 percent was accounted for by nondurable manufacturing. Note that this
58 percent is the sane as the figure for depreciation only, implying that the
mismeasurements of inventories and depreciation are distributed in the same
>.,
way. The additional taxation for manufacturing finns totalled $11.3 billion,
of which $7.4 billion was in the nondurable qoods industries.TABLE 7
Inflation, Depreciation and Corporate Tax Liabilities in Manufacturing Industries
Sample Firms ~stimated Industry Totals
S.LC. (1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5) (6) (7 ) (8)
Code Industry N Sales Overstatement Additional Additional Taxes as Overstatement Additional
Coverage of profits Taxes Percent of: of profits taxes
Actual Replacement
Taxes Value of
(percent) ($1".d.11ion) ($Mi11ion) Paid Capital ($"M:i.llion) ($Million)
20 Food &Kindred
Products 28 45 1339 642 57.0 3.0 2989 1435
21 Cigars and









Finished products 6 22 46 22 40.6 2.0 211 102
24 Lumber and
Products 6 83 678 252 100.0 2.5 820 304
25 Furniture &
Fixtures 4 69 35 17 65.1 2.0 52 25
26 Paper &
Products 20 70 858 371 100.0 2.3 1230 532
27 Publications &
Printing 12 50 153 74 28.2 2.6 308 148
28 Chemicals &
Products 43 62 1796 862 48.9 1.8 2892 1388
29 Petroleum
Products 22 49 2970 1426 70.3 1.8 6025 2892
Table 7 continues on next pageTable 7 Continued
Inflation, Depreciation and Corporate Tax Liabilities in Manufacturing Industries





























































































































All figures refer to 1976. Overstatement of profits includes the effects of both historic cost depreciation and artificial
inventory profits. The number of firms in the sample for each industra1 is shown in column 1; these firms account for the
percentage of industry sales in column 2. See text for definitions and methods.-47-
6. Conclusion
The tax laws of the United States were designed for an economy
with little or no inflation. The analysis in this paper has shown that, with
the existing tax laws, inflation substantially increases the effective tax
rate on capital income in the nonfinancial corporate sector. In contrast
to earlier studies of the inpact of inflation on corporate tax burdens,
we have considered not only the tax paid by the corporations themselves
but also the taxes paid by the individ1..k11s una instjtutions t-h."lt snpply (;(1pttr]
to the corporate sector. This is particularly LlpOl.-taut for a correct
treat:Irent of corporate debt; our calculations indicate that the additionul
tax paid by lenders because of inflation is actually slightly greater than
the taxel? that corporate borrowers save by deducting higher ila";rl.nal interest
paynents.
The overall effect of inflation with existing tax laws ~vas to
raise the real 1977 Lax burden on corporate sector capital incarre by :rrore than
$32 billion. This extra tax represented 69 perce..""lt of the real after-tax
capital inca:ne of the nonfinancial corporate sector, including retained earnings I
dividends, and the real interest receipts of the corporations I creditors. The
extra tax raised the total tax burden on nonfinancial corporate capital inCOIre
by rrore than one-half of its noninflation value, raising the total effective tax
rate from 43 percent to 66 percent.
The substantial i.lcrease in the effective tax rate on capital used
in·-the nonfin.cmcial corporate sector can influe..'1ce the }?erfonnance of the
economy in a number of irnt-ortant ways. The lIDSt obvious of these is a ~-edLlction
in the rate of capital fonnation in responsGto the reduction in "b.~e real after
,
tax rctm:n. ..L
lAlthough this reduction cannot be unambigously established, in any realistic
life cycle rrodel a lower net return will reduce private saving (Surrmers, 1978).
S<JIre preliminary empirical evidence tends to support this view (Baskin, 1978).-48-
Moreover, -since the tax rules that we have emphasized do not apply
to residential real estate, the canbination of inflation and existing tax rules
will encourage a redis~iLution of invest:Irent away fran the corporat.e s€ctcr
and to residential construction and consumsr durables. Within total corporate
invest:rne:i1t, existing tax rules will induce firros to invest i,Dre in inventories
and less in equip:rent and structures.
The evidence on individual manufacturing industries presented in
section 5 shows that there'is substantial variation unong industries to the
extent to which inflation has caused greater tax burdens. In sarre industries,
the additicnal tax induced by inflation accOlmts for less tha;.-;, 25 percent of
actual taxes paid, in other indu03tr.i.es, the additional tax induced by inflation
is, responsible for the entire actual tax payrrent. The additional tax varies
fran less than one-half perCGnt of the real capital in two industries to nearly
3 percent in others. Thus substa..~tiCll variation implies a further source of
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